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NOTE
The Constitutionality of Federal Removal Jurisdiction Over Separable
Controversies Involving Citizens of the Same State
"The law relating to the removal of causes from State to Federal
Courts may be justly characterized as a snare and a delusion." I "That
there is no other phase of American Jurisprudence with so many refine-
ments and subtleties, as relate to removal proceedings, is known by all who
have to deal with them." 2 These comments are particularly apt when
applied to removals on the ground of separable controversies. The fog
has been partially dispelled by exhaustive discussion of the characteristics
of a separable controversy.3 On the other hand, only slight attention has
been given to the constitutional theory underlying removals on this ground.
4
This constitutional consideration is the subject of the present investigation.
Removal does not stem from the common law; 5 it is a statutory
creation.6 The separable controversy basis of removal was first introduced
in 1866,7 at which time removal was limited to a defendant and to a
I. LEwis, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (1923) 8.
2. Hagerla v. Mississippi River Power Co., 2o2 Fed. 771, 773 (S. D. Iowa I912).
3. DoBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1928) 369-381; MONTGOMERY,
MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1927) § 290; 3 MOORE &
FRIEDMAN, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) § Ioi.o6; SIMKINS, FEDERAL PRACTICE
(3d ed. 1938) §§ 98, 1021, 1084, 1091; WILLIAMS, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF FED-
ERAL COURTS (1917) 113, 130, 135; Note (1936) 36 COL. L. REV. 794; Note (1928) 41
HAgv. L. REV. 1048; (934) ig IowA L. REv. 482; (932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 455.
4. See note 29 infra.
5. Chicago & Northwestern R. I v. Whitton's Administrator, 8o U. S. 270, 287
(1871). Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., 277 Fed. 812, 8ig (W. D. Wash. 1921) :
"The statute of removal of causes is no part of the common law. It cannot be said to
be either a modification or extension of a common law right or remedy. It is merely
the machinery for getting the case into the right court." DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION (1928) 347: "Quite anomalous is this removal jurisdiction under which
a defendant, sued in a court of competent jurisdiction, pro hac vice becomes dominus
litis by electing a forum of his own choosing. His right of removal thus has not even
a flavor of the common law; it is altogether statutory. Express warrant in a federal
statute must be shown in each case for the removal; otherwise, the case must remain
in the state court in which it is brought." Lavis, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (1923) § I;
SIMKINS, FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 1938) §§ io18, Iog.
6. The basis for the statutes is: U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 2: "The judicial Power
shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-
to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls ;-to all Cases
of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction ;--to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party ;-to Controversies between two or more States ;-between a State and
Citizens of another State ;-between Citizens of different States,-between Citizens of
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
7. Act of July 27, 1866, 14 STAT. 3o6 (i868), 28 U. S. C. A. § 71 (3927) : That if
in any suit already commenced, ". . . and if the suit so far relates to the alien de-
fendant or to the defendant who is the citizen of a state other than that in which the
suit is brought, is or has been instituted or prosecuted for the purpose of restraining or
enjoining him, or if the suit is one in which there can be a final determination of the
controversy, so far as it concerns him, without the presence of the other defendants as
parties in the cause, then and in every such case the alien defendant, or the defendant
who is a citizen of a state other than that in which the suit is brought, may at any time
before the trial or final hearing of the cause, file a petition for the removal of the cause
as against him into the next circuit court of the United States to be held in the district
where the suit is pending...." Note, p. 5.
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separable controversy only. The Act of 1867 extended the right of removal
of a separable controversy to either a plaintiff or defendant." The Act of
1875 permitted removal of a suit by a plaintiff or defendant if within it
there were a separable controversy wholly between citizens of different
states.9 The Act of 1887,10 which was severely criticized for its lack of
clarity," restricted the right of removal of a suit to one or more parties
8. Act of March 2, 1867, 14 STAT. 558 (1868), 28 U. S. C. A. § 7, (1927): ThisAct amended the Act of 1866 and stated: "That where a suit is now pending, or mayhereafter be brought in any state court, in which there is a controversy between a citi-zen of the state in which the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state, such citizen
of another state, . . . whether he be plaintiff or defendant, if he will make and file,in such state court, an affidavit stating that he has reason to and does believe that,from prejudice or local influence, he will not be able to obtain justice in such a state
court, may, at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit, file . . . forthe removal of the suit into the next circuit court of the United States to be held in
the district where the suit is pending." Note, p. 6.
9. Act of March 3, 1875, 18 STAT. 470 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §7I (1927):"Sec. 2. That any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity . . . arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made,under their authority, or in which the United States shall be plaintiff or petitioner, orin which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different states, or a contro-
versy between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of differentstates, or a controversy between citizens of a state and foreign states, citizens or sub-
jects, either party may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United Statesfor the proper district; and when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall bea controversy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can
be fully determined as between them, then, either one or more of the plaintiffs or de-fendants actually interested in such controversy, may remove said suit to the circuit
court of the United States for the proper district." Note, p. 7.
Io. Act of March 3, 1887, 24 STAT. 552 (1886) ; and the correction of that Act
by the Act of August 13, 1888, 25 STAT. 433, 434 (1889), 28 U. S. C. A. § 7 (1927) :"Sec. 2. And when in any suit mentioned in this section there shall be a contro-versy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully de-
termined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually inter-ested in such controversy may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United
States for the proper district. . . ." Note, p. 8.
For more complete text see note 13 infra quoting the Act of 1911, which wasstated in terms almost identical to the Act of 1887-8 except for the use of the words
"district court" in place of "circuit court"
ii. Note the criticism of John F. Dillon, Circuit Judge of the Eighth Circuit, inDILLoN, REmOvAL OF CAUSES (5th ed. 1889) § 35: "This statute [Act of 1887] enacts
the most radical and sweeping changes in the law upon this subject, and is evidently
designed to remodel the whole system of the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts. This
being the case, it was very much to be desired that its language should be clear and
,precise and its provisions perspicuous and free from doubt Unfortunately, the oppo-
site is true. Parts of the act in question are obscure and very ambiguous; in several
places its language is extremely confused; and both the meaning of the act itself and
its intended effect on previous cognate statutes are open to serious question. Indeed,
as the act was first officially promulgated, the profession was astonished to find that
it so abounded in errors of grammar and orthography as to be, in places, absolutely
unintelligible." Also that of Emory Speer, United States Judge for the Southern
District of Georgia, in SPEER, REmOVAL OF CAUSES (1888) 9, IO: "The radical andcomprehensive alterations in the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts effected by the Act
of Congress of March 3, 1887, will render a brief treatise thereon of immediate useful-ness. The subject is of great and urgent importance. The legislation conferring juris-diction upon the National Courts, or limiting or withdrawing jurisdiction already
conferred, should be as plain and as intelligible as the organic law itself. It is lament-ably true, however, that it is obscure and ambiguous; that the unjustifiable practice
of changing laws so momentous as these, in the turmoil, impatience, partisanship, andconfusion incident to the closing hours of a Congressional term, is for every reason
deplorable. It has produced much litigation under the Acts of March 2, 1867, andMarch 3, 1875, while the Act of March 3, 1887, has left jurisdictional statutes, uponwhich the gravest consequences depend, in a state of apparent doubtfulness which willnecessitate more time for comparison and study than is usually available to the coun-
sellor or attorney, in full practice, or the nisi prius judge in term."
defendant actually interested in a separable controversy.12  The current
Act of 19iis continues the lamentable ambiguity of its confusing an-
cestor, the Act of 1887. In the first sentence of the present Act, providing
for removal of federal question cases, the following terminology is used:
"Any suit . . . of which the district courts . . . are given original
jurisdiction. . . ." The second sentence in providing for removal of
diversity cases refers to: "Any other suit . . . of which the district
courts . . . are given jurisdiction. . . ." Next the sentence responsible
for much of the confusion states: "And when in any suit mentioned in this
section there shall be a controversy . . . wholly between citizens of
different states . . . the defendants actually interested in such contro-
versy may remove said suit. . . ." The following sentence referring to
local influence and prejudice as a ground for removal uses the words "a
suit." What, therefore, is "any suit mentioned in this section"? Does
this mean only a suit of which the federal courts would have original
jurisdiction? If not, is the assumption of jurisdiction constitutional?
Because the Acts of 1866 and 1867 allowed removal of only a
separable controversy which involved citizens of different states, there was
no need for a discussion of the constitutionality of the removal. After the
passage of the Act of 1875, however, there was some comment upon the
legality of that Act and its effect on the scope of federal jurisdiction.
1 4
That Act provided inter alia:
a.. . and when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different
states, and which can be fully determined as between them, then,
either one or more of the plaintiffs or defendants actually interested
in such controversy, may remove said suit to the circuit court of the
United States for the proper district."
In 1876, Judge John F. Dillon discussed the Act and decided that
under it the principles of the early decisions, stressing the requirement of
12. DILLON, RamOVAL OF CAUSES (5th ed. 1889) 42: "As we have already stated,
the Act of 1887 is a reactionary measure."
13. Act of Mhirch 3, 1911, 36 STAT. 1094 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 7, (1927): "Any
suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, arising under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority, of
which the district courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by Part I
of this title, in any State court, may be removed by the defendant or defendants therein
to the district court of the United States for the proper district. Any other suit of a
civil nature, at law or in equity, of which the district courts of the United States are
given jurisdiction, by Part I of this title, in any State court, may be removed into the
district court of the United States for the proper district by the defendant or defend-
ants therein, being nonresidents of that State. And when in any suit mentioned in
this section there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different
States, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more
of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into
the district court of the United States for the proper district. And where a suit is
brought in any State court, in which there is a controversy between a citizen of the
State in which the suit is brought and citizen of another State, any defendant, being
such citizen of another State, may remove such suit into the district court of the
United States for the proper district, at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall
be made to appear to said district court that from prejudice or local influence he will
not be able to obtain justice in such State court, or in any other State court to which
the said defendant may, under the laws of the State, have the right, on account of such
prejudice or local influence, to remove said cause.
14. DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (3d ed. 188I) prefatory note; Note (1876) 3 So.
L. REv. (N. s.) 322; Correspondence (875) 2 CENT. L. J. 274; Editorial (875) 2
id. 277; Legis. (1875) 7 CHmcAGo LEGAL Nvs 217.
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complete diversity of citizenship among the parties for federal jurisdiction,
ought not to be followed. He intimated that removal of the entire suit on
the ground of a separable controversy would be valid.15 The Judge hinted
that such an attitude might be acceptable quoting from Mr. Justice Brad-
ley's opinion in Lockart v. Horn," a case instituted in a federal court and
decided before 1875:
"Were this an original question I should say that the fact of a
common state of citizenship existing between the complainants and a
part only of the defendants, provided the other defendants were
citizens of the proper state, would not oust the court of jurisdiction.
It certainly would not under the Constitution. The case would still be
a controversy between citizens of different states. (The Act of 1875
uses the language of the Constitution, it will be remembered.) But
the strict construction put by the courts upon the Judiciary Act is
decisive against the jurisdiction; and I am bound by it. . .. " 17
Chancellor William F. Cooper, in a public reply to Judge Dillon's
article, 8 interpreted the removal of an entire suit based upon the separable
controversy clause as unconstitutional. 19 The Chancellor asserted that for
an entire suit to come under the federal judicial power as a controversy
between citizens of different states all the opposing parties must be citizens
of different states. 20 Shortly after Chancellor Cooper's assertion of uncon-
stitutionality, a contributor to the Southern Law Review supported the
constitutionality of the Act of 1875, declaring that the judicial power of
Article III was an adequate basis for removal of suits involving separable
controversies between citizens of the same state when associated with con-
troversies between nonresident defendants and the plaintiff.2 ' The argu-
ment offered, like that of Mr. Justice Bradley's, is that federal jurisdiction
is not to be interpreted under the Act of 1875 as limited to controversies
exclusively between citizens of different states. There should be no inter-
polation of the word "exclusive" into the Constitution when inspecting it
for a source of authority for jurisdiction over suits containing a partial
15. Dillon, Removal of Suits from State Courts to Federal Courts (1876) 2 So.
L. RFv. (N. s.) 282.
16. 1 Woods 628, 634 (C. C. 1871). Here a suit was instituted in-not removed
to-the federal court. Complainants were residents of Texas, and two of the defend-
ants were also residents of Texas. The court refused jurisdiction. The cause was
between a plaintiff and defendants, a few of them residing in the same state. Note
that the past construction referred to here is related to the Judiciary .Act of 1789,
and that portion which defined the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts. Cf.
Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 479-482 (1879) (concurring opinion) for a more com-
plete consideration of the departure from the rulings upon the Judiciary Act of 1789,
and sub silentio distinguishing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. i8o6).
17. Italics and parenthetical expression were used by Judge Dillon. Dillon, Re-
moval of Suits from State Courts to Federal Courts (1876) 2 So. L. Rv. (N. s.) 282,
299. See also DiLL N, REmOVAL OF CAUSES (5th ed. I889) 17, 35, 115.
18. Cooper, Removal of Causes from State to Federal Courts (877) 3 So. L. REv.
(N. s.) i.
19. This champion of the integrity of the scope of state court jurisdiction was
William F. Cooper, Chancellor for the Seventh Chancery District of Tennessee, later
one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Tennessee.
2o. Cooper, Removal of Causes from State to Federal Courts (1877) 3 So. L.
Rxv. (N. s.) 13 presents the question: Why remove the entire suit if the requirement
for removal is a controversy wholly between citizens of different states that is capable
of complete determination as between them?
21. R. MCP. Smith, Removal of Causes from State to Federal Courts (0877) 3
So. L. REv. (N. s.) 227.
community of citizenship between the parties. In addition, the article
attacked the use of the theory of ancillary jurisdiction, employed in order
to assume control over the residual controversy between the parties of the
same state, as indefensible should the judicial power be considered to
e.xtend only to controversies exclusively between citizens of different states.
Ancillary jurisdiction was criticized as being "in essence a non-federal
fringe upon a garment of federal jurisdiction." 
22
Nevertheless, a short time after the passage of the Act of 1875, the
separable controversy clause was regarded as constitutional by the. Circuit
Court of the Northern District of Illinois upon the basis, of the theory
of ancillary jurisdiction. 23  It was not until i88o, in Barney v. Latham,
2
that the Supreme Court passed upon the separable controversy clause, after
having reserved their opinion upon that portion of the Act of 1875 in the
consideration of the Removal Cases.
25
From the passage of the Act of 1875 to the present day, the Barney
case 2 6 colors the judicial approval of the practice of removal of an entire
suit. This case enables federal courts to assume control over controversies
involving non-federal questions between parties of the same state. It is of
interest to note that in the Barney case there is no analysis of the con-
stitutionality of the assumption of complete control over all the contro-
versies involved. The consideration of the statute by the Court was as
follows:
"But while the Act of 1866, in express terms, authorized the
removal only of the separable controversy between plaintiff and de-
fendant or defendants seeking removal,-leaving the remainder of the
suit, at election of plaintiff, in the state court,-the Act of 1875 pro-
vides, in that class of cases, for the removal of the entire suit.
"That such was the intention of Congress is a proposition which
seems too obvious to require enforcement by argument. . . . Rather
than split up such a suit between courts of different jurisdictions,
Congress determined that the removal of the separable controversy
to which the judicial power of the United States was, by the Constitu-
tion, expressly extended, should operate to transfer the whole suit to
the federal court.
"If the clause of the Act of 1875, under consideration, is not to
be thus construed, it is difficult to perceive what purpose there was
in dropping those portions of the Act of 1866 27 which, ex industria,
22. Id. at 245.
23. Osgood v. Chicago, Danville & Vincennes R. R., 18 Fed. Cas. No. lO,604, at
879, 88o (N. D. Ill. 1875). Plaintiff, a citizen of Massachusetts, instituted suit in a
state court. Defendants were a railroad that was a citizen of Illinois, trustees of the
railroad mortgage (citizens of states other than Illinois or Massachusetts), and cred-
itors of the railroad who were citizens of Massachusetts. It was held that the entire
suit was removable. Justice Drummon announced: "It is insisted . . . the federal
court would take jurisdiction of a controversy between citizens of the same state,
which would be unconstitutional. . . . If we were to admit the premises, we hardly
think the conclusion would follow. . . .Having control and jurisdiction of the prin-
cipal, the incidents go with it. . .
24. 103 U. S. 205 (1880).
25. 1OO U. S. 457 (1879).
26. 103 U. S. 205 (188o). Heirs of X who were citizens of Minnesota and In-
diana sued business associates of X who were citizens of New York, Wisconsin, Mass-
achusetts, and Minnesota. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court judgment
of the circuit court was reversed with directive to overrule motion to remand, to rein-
state cause on docket, and proceed with the case.
27. See statute quoted in note 7 supra.
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limited the removal, in the class of cases therein provided for, to that
controversy in the suit, which is distinctly between citizens of different
states, and of which there could be a final determination without the
presence of the other defendants as parties in the cause.
"It remains oAly to inquire how far this construction of the Act
of 1875 controls the case now before us. .. , 25
The above quotation is the closest approach to a consideration of con-
stitutionality by the Supreme Court of the problem of federal jurisdiction
over controversies on non-federal questions involving citizens of the same
state. This is considered to be the leading case establishing such jurisdic-
tion. Many standard reference publications cite the rule of this case with-
out noting the limits of the opinion.2 9 From such reasoning there is only
28. 103 U. S. 205, 212, 213 (I88O).
29. I DESTY, MANUAL OF PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES (18.9)
§ 98; DILLON, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (5th ed. 1889) § 41; 3 FOSTER, TRAIsE ON FED-
ERAL PRACTICE (6th ed. 1921) § 541; LEwis, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (1923) § 147; MONT-
GOMERY, MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1927) § 290; 3
MoORE & FRIEDMAN, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (1938) § ioi.o6; SIMKINS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE (3d ed. 1938) § 1084; SPEER, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (I888) § 28; WILLIAMS,
JURISDICTION & PRACTICE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1917) 113, 130, 135.
The confusion created by the lack of a fundamentally reasoned decision in Barney
v. Lathant, under the Act of 1875, and an application of the rule in that case to the
equivocal Act of 1911 caused one authority to announce two conflicting rules upon the
subject within the space of two consecutive pages in his text. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1928) 371: "Instead of the clearer wording of the first and
second sentences, 'of which the District Courts of the United States are given [orig-
inal] jurisdiction by this title,' the third sentence adopts the terminology 'when in
any suit mentioned in this section.' But the meaning seems to be the same, and in
removals on the ground of a separable controversy it seems that the suit as filed in the
state court must be one within the District Court's original jurisdiction. Both the
literal interpretation of the words and the purpose and philosophy of the statute seem
to justify this principle." Cf. id. at 372: "Though the ground of removal is the sepa-
rable controversy within the suit, it is well settled that the effect of the removal is
to take to the federal court, not merely the controversy, but the entire suit . .
Query, if the scope of removal is limited to that of original jurisdiction, how can the
court receive a separable determinable controversy of a non-federal question between
citizens of the same state over which it has no original jurisdiction?,
Id. at 345 seemble: "The removal jurisdiction of the District Court is very rarely
broader, frequently narrower, than its original jurisdiction. The limitations on the
' original jurisdiction apply to the removal jurisdiction, and there are, in addition, many
restrictions on the removal of cases from a state court to the District Court which
are inapplicable to cases originally instituted in the District Court."
4 HUGHES, FEDERAL PRACTICE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (Pocket Part 1945)
§ 2362: "The removal of a separable cause of action brings the entire case into the
Federal court, although a part of it may not be removable. ia. '. . . Under Const.
art. 3, § 2, Congress was authorized to provide that, when a portion of a cause is re-
movable as a separable controversy, the entire cause is removed although not all the
parties to the other controversies could come into the federal court. Sperry v. Wabash
R. Co., D. C. Ill. 1944, 52 F. Supp. 337."'
For a more critical consideration of the jurisdiction problem see MOON, REMOVAL
OF CAUSES (909) 395: "§ 138. Must a suit be within the original jurisdiction of a
United States Circuit Court to be removable thereto from a State court under clause 3
of § 2 of the act of 1875 as amended by the act of x887-88, known as the separable
controverty clause? The meaning of clause 3 of section 2 of the present judiciary act,
which is held to authorize the removal of a cause from a State court to a United
States Circuit Cotirt upon the ground that it contains a separable controversy, is not
clearly expressed. Its meaning is yet, in some respects, after years of litigation and
many decisions construing such clause, obscure and uncertain." Also (1925) 30 ILL.
L. REV. 396.
an inference of constitutionality.-0 By nonreference to the fundamental
problem of the validity of the statute, the Court announced a possible in-
terpretation of the congressional expression concerning the breadth of"
federal jurisdiction under the Constitution. It is noteworthy that in this
oft-cited case the entire emphasis is on the intent of Congress, 3. not upon
the constitutionality of their efforts; and also that the case was decided by
a divided court, Chief Justice Waite, justice Miller, and Justice Field
dissenting.
A contemporary, lower federal court called attention to the conspicuous
absence of fundamental reasoning in the Barney case:
"It is noticeable that the Supreme Court puts its decision in
Barney v. Latham entirely upon the construction of the second clause
of the second section of the Act of March 3, 1875, without any refer-
ence to the constitutional difficulty. There may be no doubt about
the construction of the clause, and yet the constitutional difficulty may
remain . . .., 32
Later, two federal courts questioned the point of constitutionality of
the removal of a controversy involving a non-federal question between
residents of the same state. In one case the court said:
"The Question remains: Is this scheme constitutional in removals
for separable controversy, if the suit contains other controversies to
which the federal judicial power does not directly extend? Does not
the Constitution exclude from the removal at least the separable con-
troversies over which a federal court is by it given no jurisdiction?
The question is of great interest and importance, affecting a mass of
litigation, present and future, and possibly reaching back to judg-
ments in the past. Though present in the law since 1875, it seems
not to have had direct consideration and authoritative consideration." 33
In another case it was said:
"The Supreme Court has never discussed the constitutionality
of the provision for removal of the entire suit, containing a contro-
versy wholly between citizens of the same state, and the lower federal
,, 34courts have touched on it in but few cases ...
The same Court that decided Barney v. Latham must have realized
that its opinion in that case might be the starting point of a widespread
practice to remove a large number of cases involving partial diversity of
citizenship into the federal courts. For at the earliest opportunity, pre-
sented by Blake v. McKim, 5 emphasis was placed upon the need of de-
30. Note (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 1O48, lO49 n. 13: "The constitutionality of
allowing removal of the whole suit because of a separable controversy, though never
litigated, has so long been tacitly accepted that it is no longer open to question. . .
Under what principle of law does tacit acceptance of a constitutional question over
a long period of time equal an answer to the question?
31. See second paragraph of the quotation from Barney v. Latham in text at p.
243 supra.
32. Iowa Homestead Co. v. Des Moines Navigation & R. R., 8 Fed. 97, l05 (C. C.
S. D. Iowa 1881).
33. Hoffman v. Lynch, 23 F. (2d) 518, 521 (N. D. Ga. 1928).
34. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, 15o F. (2d) 227, 233 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
35. 103 U. S. 336 (i88o) (same term as Barney v. Latham). A citizen of Massa-
chusetts sued two executors of X. One executor lived in Massachusetts, the other in
New York. Held: Not removable. Controversy did not present a separable contro-
versy; nor was it wholly between citizens of different states.
1946] NOTE
246 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94
fining the limits of such removability. It was stated that the Act of 1875
should not be extended beyond cases including a wholly separable con-
troversy between citizens of different states. The decision suggested con-
cern regarding an increased overcrowding of the dockets, and a distaste
for too great a departure from the long established demarcation between
the jurisdiction of the state and federal courts. 8 The next five Supreme
Court cases 8 that cite Barney v. Latham for the rule permitting the
removal of the complete suit distinguish the cases upon factual bases. All
deny jurisdiction. An additional observation supporting the assertion of
a judicial attitude favoring an unannounced policy of limitation is based
upon the fact that three of the opinions 38 deciding against removal were
written by Chief Justice Waite, one of the dissenters in Barney v. Latham.89
The other two opinions written by Mr. Justice Harlan,40 author of the
majority opinion in the Barney case, also imposed a restrictive influence
upon the factual application of the rule of that case.
4 '
A recent high-water mark in the application of the rule of the Barney
case was set by Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Felt,42 an action
in the alternative for damages under the workmen's compensation law of
Texas for the death of a husband: Suit was brought in a Texas court
against three insurance companies, incorporated in California, Connecticut,
and Texas. One of the nonresident defendants removed the suit to a
federal court upon the basis of a separable controversy. The federal court
peremptorily instructed a verdict for the two nonresident defendants, and
a judgment was issued against the resident defendant. 43  Upon appeal the
judgment was affirmed.
Here is a clear example of the extreme position in which a federal
court can be placed under the rule of Barney v. Latham.44 The federal
judicial system, to the exclusion of the state courts, completely decided a
controversy between citizens of the same state upon a non-federal question.
This was accomplished by asserting a procedural right of removal over a
separable controversy, which was, by requirement for removal, capable of
full determination between the nonresident defendant and the plaintiff.
The court again, on appeal, directs attention to the lack of a Supreme
Court decision analyzing the constitutionality of such action. 4 The opinion
ventures to render the decision less startling by announcing that, in spite
36. There was no legislation changing the complete diversity of citizenship re-
quirement for the right of removal from the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789 tb the
Act of March 3, 1875.
37. Blake v. McKin, 103 U. S. 336 (i88o) ; Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 409 (1881);
Fraser v. Jennison, io6 U. S. 191 (1882) ; Thayer v. Life Ass'n of America, 112 U. S.
717 (1885); Brboks v. Clark, i19 U. S. 512 (I886).
38. Hyde v. Ruble, 104 U. S. 409 (1881); Fraser v. Jennison, io6 U. S. 19I
(1882) ; Brooks v. Clark, 119 U. S. 512 (1886).
39. 103 U. S. 205 (188o). (Dissenting members: Chief Justice Waite, Justices
Miller and Field.)
40. Blake v. McKim, 103 U. S. 336 (188o); Thayer v. Life Ass'n of America,
112 U. S. 717 (18851.
41. 3 MOORE & FRIEDMAN, MoopEs FEDERAL PRAcTrcE (1938) § ioi.06. Where
it is suggested that "it would be advisable to withdraw the removal privilege as to
separable controversies and thus lessen the burden of litigation in the federal courts
and avoid what is sometimes a difficult problem to determine, whether a controversy
is separable or indivisible." Note (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 794.
42. i5o F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. Sth, 1945).
43. District Court, Southern District of Texas. Opinion not reported.
44. 103 U. S. 205 (188o).
45. Judicial comment quoted in text at p. 245 supra.
of the shortcoming of the opinion in the leading case, such action could be
sustained upon a theory of ancillary jurisdiction. 46
When using the theory of ancillary jurisdiction it is assumed that,
once judicial control prevails over a single separable controversy between
the nonresident defendant and the plaintiff, all other controversies in the
suit are immediately subject to federal control. Regarding the basis for
this theory of ancillary jurisdiction there are two views: one view is that
control over the principal part implies control over the lesser parts; 47 the
other view holds that if the federal court exercises jurisdiction over a
portion of a dispute it must control all portions to bring about justice in
the case.48  To uphold jurisdiction under the first view, the controversy
should not only be a separable controversy capable of full determination,
but it also should be the principal controversy. This factor is not required
for removal under the statute governing the right of removal.4 9  The
operation of a procedural requirement of this kind would produce still
greater complexity in the already confused field of removal litigation. To
use the second view advanced to support ancillary jurisdiction all the
controversies must go into the federal court to work justice. This is open
to question. Are the state courts not capable of doing justice in the con-
troversy between parties of the same state? Does justice arise out of the
imposition of the added burden of transfer upon the similar state parties,
when, by statute, the petitioner for removal is required to show that his
controversy is separable and completely capable of determination when
standing alone? 50 A further attempt to justify ancillary jurisdiction may
be made upon the argument of efficiency.51 One is forced, however, to
inquire whether or not it is efficient to tax the federal courts with con-
troversies that can be decided in the state courts 'merely because one non-
resident party selects the federal forum to decide the controversy in which
he is interested. When using the ancillary jurisdiction theory one court
has acknowledged that constitutionally the lower federal courts have no
independent jurisdiction over non-federal controversies between citizens
of the same state.52  What, then, is the source of authority for removal
jurisdiction over such controversies? 53
The review of the development of the law of the removal of separable
controversies illustrates the confusion and incoherence that can be caused
46. i5o F. (2d) 227, 234 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945).
47. Fulton Nat'l Bank of Atlanta v. Hozier, 267 U. S. 276, 28o (1924). See also
note 23 supra.
48. WILLIAMS, JURISDICTION AND PRAcricE OF FEDERAL COURTS (1917) § 4.
49. DILLON, REmOVAL OF CAUSES (5th ed. 1889) 51: "And when this state of
facts exists [a controversy capable of complete separation and determination between
citizens of different states], it is immaterial whether the separable controversy be con-
sidered the main or principal one in the suit or not, or what other controversies or par-
ties are involved in it."
50. MooN, REMOVAL OF CAUSES (1909) § 147 n. 7.
5I. WILLIAMS, JURISDICTION AND PRAcTIcE OF FEDERAL COURTS (1917) § 4.
52. 150 F. (2d) 227, 234 (C. C. A. 5th, 1945). Query, how can this ancillary
theory permit a federal court to have jurisdiction over a matter which it does not have
under original jurisdiction? Such an approach would permit indirectly that which
could not be done directly.
53. The process of removal was designed to eliminate the existence of injustice
due to possible state prejudices and not to allow the plaintiff to destroy the nonresi-
dent defendant's privilege of the federal forum by instituting a suit in a state court. It
was not invented to encroach upon the judicial activity of the state courts. A statutory
change in the scope of federal court jurisdiction should be construed with a high re-
gard for the limits of the grant of federal judicial power within the Constitution. See
DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1928) 347. Quoted note 5 supra.
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by the poor draftsmanship of a statute,54 This is especially so in the right
of removal, where the entire law of the subject is founded upon a statutory
origin." The enactment is not clear in stating whether the right of
removal, under the separable controversy clause, is to be limited by the
long established rule of original jurisdiction, 56 or increased by the creation
of a new and different type of federal jurisdiction.57 The case of Barney
v. Latham 58 presents little assistance for the interpretation of the present
Act. The Court in the Barney case, dealing with the Act of 1875, did not
discuss the constitutionality of federal jurisdiction over non-federal con-
troversies between citizens of the same state, but considered only the
intent of Congress to remove the entire suit. 5 The fact that the extent
of federal judicial power might be changed escaped attention. It is a
source of amazement that so fundamental an issue as the broadening of
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts has not been reviewed in rela-
tion to the constitutional grant of federal judicial authority.
The law under the removal statute is still in a state of conflict. Barney
v. Latham 60 has not been overruled. The decision is still used to enable
a lower federal court to try a case wherein the opposing parties share a
partial community of citizenship. 61 In a later consideration of a clause
in the Act of 1887 governing removal because of local prejudice,
62 the
Court, however, specifically announced tlat that portion of the Act does
not include cases "wherein the controversy was partly between citizens of
the same State." 63 It stated: "To hold otherwise brings the language of
the clause into conflict with the rule that a suit to be removable must be
within the original jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, departs from the
54. DILLON, REmoVAL OF CAUSES (5th ed. 1889) 5i; SPEER, REmovAL OF CAUSES
(1888) §.35; Andrews, Federal Removal Confusion (1936) 9 Miss. L. J. I88, 192:
"The Act of 1887, corrected in 1888, is the present removal statute, and for that rea-
son merits a special examination. It would seem that from its very inception there
was confusion concerning its provisions. Although the act, when printed in the stat-
ute books, conformed to the enrollment, the enrolled act, when compared with the
original papers on file in the secretary's office, contained twenty-five mistakes in spell-
ing, in punctuation, in changing and omitting words, and in the structure of the bill.
It is difficult to find the exact intentions of the framers of the bill due to the fact that
there is only a slight account in the Congressional Record of the proceedings of the
Senate and the House in regard to the measure.
55. Chicago & Northwestern R. R. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 8o U. S. 27o, 287 (1871);
Wenzler v. Robin Line S. S. Co., 277 Fed. 812, Sg (W. D. Wash. 1921).
56. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. i8o6).
57. DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION (1928) 372; 4 HUGHES, FEDERAL
PRAcTIC, JURISDICrION AND PROCEDURE (Pocket Part 1945) § 2362.
58. 103 U. S. 205 (i88o).
59. See quotation of a portion of the decision in the text at pp. 243-4 supra.
6o. 103 U. S. 205 (i88o).
61. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Felt, I5o F. (2d) 227 (C. C. A. 5th, I945),
discussed in text, p. 246 supra.
62. Act of March 3, 1887, 24 STAT. 552 (1886) ; and the correction of that Act by
the Act of August 13, 1888, 25 STAT. 433, 434 (1889), 28 U. S. C. A. § 71 (1927) :
"And where a suit is now pending, or may be hereafter brought, in any State court,
in which there is a controversy between a citizen of the State, in which the suit is
brought and a citizen of another State, any defendant, being such citizen of another
State may remove such suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper
district, at any time before the trial thereof, when it shall be made to appear to said cir-
cuit court that from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice
in such State court, or in any other State court to which the said defendant may, under
the laws of the State, have the right, on account of such prejudice or local influence,
to remove said cause. . . . Note, p. 8. Mark the similarity to the Act of igii,
which is quoted in note 13 supra.
63. Cochran v. Montgomery County, 199 U. S. 260, 272 (9o5).
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settled former construction, and ignores the main purpose of the act of
1887, which was to restrict the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. . ." 64
An attempt to explain away the conflict and produce an apparently
uniform concept of the scope of the lower federal court jurisdiction under
the present removal statute is impossible. The statute, in spite of its
seventy years of existence, continues to possess an inherent ambiguity, a
defect that might well have been caused by a lack of thorough study of the
complexities of the subject at the time of its origin."5 A statute of such
jurisdictional importance should command the attention of the legislature
for the purpose of revision and restatement, a task that should not be
placed indirectly upon the courts.
J.L.E.
64. Ibid. In addition: "But the fourth clause, treating of removals because of
prejudice or local influence, does not furnish a separate and independent ground of
Federal jurisdiction, and, as Mr. Justice Bradley said in In re Pennsylvania Company,
137 U. S. 451, 456, 'describes only a special case comprised in the preceding clauses.'f. Id. at 27o.
65. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, BusINEss OF THE SUPREaS COURT (1927) 13: "Leg-
islation concerning judicial organization throughout our history has been a very em-
piric response to very definite needs." See also notes ii and 54 supra.
